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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 David Calhoun appeals two orders of the District Court dismissing his claims 
against former Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole Secretary Lawrence F. 
Murray (“State Defendant/Appellee”), former Assistant U.S. Attorney Kenya Mann, 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Joel Goldstein, and the U.S. Marshals Service (“Federal 
Defendants/Appellees”).  Calhoun alleges that the Appellees violated his liberty and 
caused him to be falsely imprisoned by keeping him in custody during his federal trial 
after he posted bail.  Because the District Court erred in dismissing Calhoun’s claims 
against Mann and Goldstein on res judicata grounds and failed to provide adequate 
reasoning in dismissing Calhoun’s claim against Murray, we will vacate the District 
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Court’s orders and remand the case to the District Court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
In December 2005, Calhoun was serving a state sentence when the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections transferred him to federal custody to stand trial in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania on federal drug charges.  Calhoun posted bail on the federal drug 
charges on July 28, 2005, and his state sentence expired on February 23, 2006.  Calhoun, 
however, remained in detention throughout his federal trial, which concluded with a 
guilty verdict and a sentence of 20 years imprisonment and 10 years supervised release.  
On August 17, 2006, Calhoun appealed his conviction on the basis of insufficiency of the 
evidence, trial court error, and prosecutorial misconduct.  On May 1, 2008, this Court 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court.  During Calhoun’s criminal proceedings, 
Mann and Goldstein were counsel for the government.  Mann was predecessor counsel; 
Goldstein was trial and appellate counsel. 
 In early 2008, Calhoun filed two suits, one in federal court (“original federal court 
action”) and the other in Pennsylvania state court (“original state court action”), alleging 
that Murray, Mann, Goldstein, and the U.S. Marshals Service violated his liberty and 
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caused him to be falsely imprisoned.  This appeal concerns the original state court action, 
but an explanation of both cases is pertinent to our analysis. 
No. 08-cv-0458 – The Original Federal Court Action 
 The original federal court action was commenced on January 30, 2008, when 
Calhoun filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against Murray, Mann, Goldstein, and the U.S. Marshals Service.  Calhoun 
asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that the defendants 
“worked in collusion to deprive [Calhoun] of his liberty in the form of false 
imprisonment” because “upon reaching his maximum term expiration date of his state 
sentence on Feb. 23, 2006, [Calhoun] remained in [the] custody of the federal authorities 
despite the fact that he had posted bail on his federal case.” 
On March 18, 2008, the District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  The District Court held that the complaint did not 
state a claim against Murray, that Mann and Goldstein were absolutely immune from suit 
as prosecutors, and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the 
U.S. Marshals Service.  On March 27, 2008, Calhoun filed an amended complaint that 
dropped the U.S. Marshals Service as a defendant.  Also, because Murray was no longer 
the Secretary of the Parole Board, the complaint was amended on September 17, 2008 to 
substitute the sitting Secretary, Cynthia Daub, as a defendant. 
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The defendants then filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court granted on 
December 18, 2008.  With regard to Mann and Goldstein, the District Court concluded 
that it was reasonable for the federal prosecutors to believe that Calhoun’s continued 
detention did not violate his constitutional rights.  Accordingly, Calhoun’s claims against 
Mann and Goldstein were dismissed on account of qualified immunity.  With regard to 
Daub, the District Court held that although the amended complaint alleged claims against 
her predecessor, Murray, it did not allege that Daub “either directed or acquiesced in 
permitting the decision to detain [Calhoun] after the expiration of his state sentence,” and 
therefore did not satisfy the personal involvement requirement of § 1983.  The District 
Court entered a judgment dismissing the case. 
On December 26, 2008, Calhoun filed a motion for reconsideration.  With regard 
to Mann and Goldstein, Calhoun argued that the court should have permitted him to 
amend his complaint to present evidence of his claims.  With regard to Daub, Calhoun 
asserted that he had sought an extension of time to respond to Daub’s motion to dismiss, 
but his motion never reached the District Court.  Calhoun explained that previous filings 
had not reached their intended recipients and that he had formally complained to this 
Court about the courthouse mailroom procedures.  He attached as an exhibit to his motion 
a letter from the Circuit Executive stating that “[a]n investigation of [his] complaint 
revealed a problem with the mail intake process for the Courthouse and the Clerk’s 
Office.” 
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On January 22, 2009, the District Court denied reconsideration as to Mann and 
Goldstein, but held the motion in abeyance as to Daub.  The District Court concluded that 
Calhoun’s representation that he had filed an extension motion, coupled with the Circuit 
Executive’s letter concerning problems in the courthouse mailroom, justified holding the 
reconsideration motion in abeyance so that Calhoun could respond to Daub’s motion to 
dismiss.  The District Court directed Calhoun to file that response by February 23, 2009.  
Calhoun subsequently filed the response on February 23, 2009, but the District Court has 
yet to rule on his reconsideration motion. 
On February 24, 2010, after Calhoun filed a notice of appeal, this Court dismissed 
Calhoun’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, noting that the District Court had yet 
to resolve the claims against Daub, and thus, the order was not yet appealable. 
No. 08-cv-4707 – The Original State Court Action 
After initiating the original federal court action, Calhoun attempted to assert 
similar claims in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Murray, Mann, 
Goldstein, and the U.S. Marshals Service.  To this end, on February 14, 2008, Calhoun 
dispatched a “praecipe,” which was styled as a complaint, to the Court of Common Pleas 
alleging that “the defendants have, in their negligence and/or deliberate indifference to 
[Calhoun’s] liberty interest caused [Calhoun] to be falsely imprisoned through over-
detention.”  The praecipe was never docketed in the Court of Common Pleas, however, 
and was instead docketed in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania on May 2, 2008.  
On May 22, 2008, the Commonwealth Court dismissed the case as filed in error. 
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Calhoun filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on June 4, 
2008, challenging the Commonwealth Court’s dismissal of the action without providing 
him an opportunity to respond.  On September 17, 2008, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania noted probable jurisdiction. 
 On September 30, 2008, the Federal Defendants filed a notice of removal of 
Calhoun’s action to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
which was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) – the federal officer removal provision.  On 
October 16, 2008, Calhoun filed an objection to the removal as untimely under 
§ 1446(b)’s 30-day time period for removal.  The Federal Defendants responded that their 
removal was not untimely because § 1446(b)’s 30-day time period commences upon 
service of the complaint, and they were never properly served.  The District Court, on 
October 29, 2008, denied Calhoun’s objection to the timeliness of removal. 
 On December 24, 2008, the Federal Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
removed action and argued that the dismissal of the original federal action was res 
judicata of the claims against defendants Mann and Goldstein in the removed action.  The 
District Court subsequently, on March 26, 2009, dismissed the claims against defendants 
Mann and Goldstein on the basis of res judicata.  The District Court also dismissed 
Calhoun’s claim against the U.S. Marshals Service, construing the claim as one under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and concluding that Calhoun had not 
satisfied the prerequisites for such a claim. 
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 On March 6, 2009, while the proceedings against the Federal Defendants were 
ongoing, Murray filed a motion to dismiss.  On March 23, 2009, Calhoun requested a 45-
day extension of the time within which to respond to Murray’s motion to dismiss, 
explaining that he was proceeding pro se, had no legal training, and had limited access to 
the prison’s law library.  The District Court granted Calhoun’s motion on May 12, 2009 
and ordered him to respond within 14 days.  On May 26, 2009, Calhoun filed a 
handwritten motion for an additional 30-day extension of time, explaining that he had 
been placed in a restrictive housing unit and was unable to access his legal materials.  
The District Court did not rule on this motion, and, on May 28, 2009, filed the following 
order: 
“[T]he motion to dismiss filed by Lawrence F. Murray is GRANTED.  All 
claims against Lawrence F. Murray are DISMISSED.  THIS CASE IS 
CLOSED.” 
 
 Also on May 28, 2009, Calhoun filed a motion to amend his complaint, which was 
dismissed as moot on June 2, 2009.  On May 29, 2009, Calhoun sought reconsideration, 
which was denied on June 25, 2009.  Calhoun filed a timely notice of appeal with this 
Court on July 1, 2009.  On February 1, 2010, the Federal Appellees filed a motion for 
summary affirmance, arguing that the issues on appeal were identical to the those raised 
in Calhoun’s then-pending appeal in the original federal court action.  On June 29, 2010, 
this Court denied the motion for summary affirmance, explaining: 
“To the extent Appellees are attempting to make a res judicata argument in 
support of their motion, we reject that . . . because there does not appear to 
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be a final appealable order in the DC No. 08-cv-0458 [the original federal 
court action].” 
 
II. 
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 due to Calhoun’s appeal of a final order in the 
District Court. 
 This Court exercises de novo review of a district court’s dismissal of a complaint, 
including dismissal based on res judicata.  Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 172, 177 
(3d Cir. 2011).  We review a district court’s decision regarding a motion for extension of 
time for abuse of discretion.  Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010).  
With regard to a district court’s denial of a motion to remand, we exercise plenary review 
to the extent that the underlying basis for the motion presents a legal question.  Ario v. 
Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 
277, 287 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
A. 
 As an initial argument, the Federal Appellees assert that the doctrine of derivative 
jurisdiction provides a basis for dismissal of Calhoun’s claims against Mann and 
Goldstein in their official capacities along with Calhoun’s claims against the U.S. 
Marshals Service. 
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Under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, a federal district court is without 
proper removal jurisdiction if the state court from which the case was removed lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, even if the case could have originally been filed in federal 
court.  Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939).  Although the doctrine of 
derivative jurisdiction has been abrogated for removals under the general removal statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1441, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f), the doctrine arguably still applies to removals, 
as in this case, pertaining to federal officers, 28 U.S.C. § 1442.  See, e.g., Rodas v. 
Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 2011); Palmer v. City Nat’l Bank, 498 F.3d 236, 246 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
Regardless of whether the District Court exercised proper removal jurisdiction of 
Calhoun’s claims against Mann, Goldstein, and the U.S. Marshals Service, the doctrine of 
derivative jurisdiction does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction on appeal.  While 
“[c]hallenges to subject-matter jurisdiction can of course be raised at any time prior to 
final judgment,” even for the first time on appeal, Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 
L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004), challenges based on procedural defects in removal cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal.  Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 
699, 702 (1972).  
Our jurisdiction on appeal in this matter is governed by Grubbs because “[t]he 
doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, despite its perhaps improvident name, is best 
understood as a procedural bar to the exercise of federal judicial power.  That is, the 
doctrine creates a defect in removal, but is not an essential ingredient to federal subject 
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matter jurisdiction.”  Rodas, 656 F.3d at 619; see also Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 784 
(6th Cir. 1989); Foval v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, 841 F.2d 126, 
129 (5th Cir. 1988); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1987). 
Each of Calhoun’s claims could have been properly filed in the District Court.  
Therefore, we are not deprived of jurisdiction on appeal, despite the existence of any 
potential procedural errors in removal. 
B. 
 Calhoun argues that the District Court erroneously dismissed his claims against 
Mann and Goldstein on the basis of res judicata and that res judicata cannot present a 
barrier to his claims because there has been no final judgment in his previous case, the 
original federal court action.1
                                              
1 Calhoun asserts that this Court’s June 29, 2010 denial of summary affirmance 
based on a lack of finality in the original federal court action is law of the case and binds 
our present consideration of the issue.  However, the June 29, 2010 denial of summary 
affirmance was issued by a motions panel of this Court, and a decision of a motions panel 
is not binding on a merits panel for the purpose of the law of the case.  Council Tree 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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The preclusive effect of a federal court judgment is determined by federal law.2
In Clausen Co. v. Dynatron/Bondo Corp., we vacated a judgment that was 
erroneously predicated on res judicata by holding that the finality requirement was not 
met: 
  
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008).  To succeed in the assertion of a res judicata 
defense, the defendant must show there has been “(1) a final judgment of the merits in a 
prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privies; and (3) a subsequent suit based 
on the same causes of action.”  Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Unless a court expressly determines that finality is warranted and there is no 
just reason for delay, “any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as 
to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54(b). 
“The adjudication relied upon was of the second count of a two count 
complaint . . . . The first count is still pending in the district court.  Thus the 
                                              
2 The District Court erroneously conducted a res judicata analysis under state law 
rather than federal law.  The Federal Appellees attempt to justify the District Court’s 
analysis by citing this Court’s opinion in Delaware River Port Authority v. Fraternal 
Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A federal court looks to the law of 
the adjudicating state to determine its preclusive effect.”).  However, unlike Calhoun’s 
case, in which the question is whether a previous federal court decision has a preclusive 
effect, Delaware River involved a question of whether a previous state court decision had 
a preclusive effect.  Only when the previous decision comes from a state court will a 
federal court analyze the preclusive effect of the previous decision under state law. 
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disposition of the second count falls squarely within Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  
There has been no express determination that Count II is a separate claim 
on which a final judgment should be entered.  Thus the disposition of Count 
II is interlocutory, and subject to reconsideration by the district court so 
long as Count I remains pending.” 
 
889 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Here, the District Court failed to consider the lack of finality in the original federal 
court action.  In ruling on Calhoun’s motion for reconsideration in the original federal 
court action, the District Court held as follows: 
“Regarding Defendant Daub, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is 
HELD IN ABEYANCE.  On or before February 23, 2009, Plaintiff shall 
provide this Court with his Response to Defendant Daub’s Motion to 
Dismiss.  Consistent with the local rules, Defendant Daub may reply to 
Defendant.  At that time, this Court will reexamine the merits of Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Reconsideration as it pertains to Defendant Daub.” 
 
 Calhoun has since provided his response to Daub’s motion to dismiss, but the 
District Court has yet to reexamine the merits of Calhoun’s motion for reconsideration.  
The District Court, in the original federal court action, did not expressly determine that 
finality was warranted.  Therefore, as in Clausen, the res judicata finality requirement has 
not been met because the previous adjudication was on only one count of a two count 
complaint, the other count is still pending, and the disposition of the adjudicated count is 
still subject to reconsideration by the District Court so long as the other count remains 
 
14 
pending.  889 F.2d at 466.  The District Court thus erroneously dismissed Calhoun’s 
claims against Mann and Goldstein on res judicata grounds.3
C. 
 
 Calhoun asserts that the District Court erred in not ruling on his motion for an 
extension of time to respond to Murray’s motion to dismiss before granting Murray’s 
motion to dismiss, thus effectively denying his motion for an extension of time.  We 
review denials of motions for extension of time for an abuse of discretion.  See Drippe v. 
Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We deem it self-evident that appellate 
courts cannot too easily agree to meddle in such case-management decisions lest the trial 
court’s authority be undermined and the systems sputter.”). 
 On March 6, 2009, Murray filed a motion to dismiss.  On March 23, 2009, 
Calhoun moved for a 45-day extension of time to file a response.  The District Court 
granted Calhoun’s motion for a 45-day extension and, on May 12, 2009, informed 
Calhoun that he was required to respond within 14 days.  When Calhoun subsequently 
                                              
3 The Federal Appellees, for the first time on appeal, argue that although the 
District Court based its decision on res judicata (or claim preclusion) grounds, the 
decision can be upheld on the basis of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion).  However, 
even under the less stringent standards for collateral estoppel, a prior adjudication must 
be “sufficiently firm” in order to have issue-preclusive effect, and an important criterion 
in assessing the firmness of the prior decision is “whether [the] decision could have been, 
or actually was, appealed.”  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 677 F.3d 
519, 541 (3d Cir. 2012).  Because Calhoun attempted to appeal the District Court’s order 
in the original federal court action, and this Court dismissed the appeal due to a lack of 
finality, we decline to hold that that the District Court’s erroneous res judicata decision 
can be upheld on collateral estoppel grounds. 
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filed a handwritten motion for an additional 30-day extension of time, the District Court 
was under no obligation to grant the request.  Thus, the District Court did not err in 
denying Calhoun’s motion for an extension of time. 
D. 
 Calhoun argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his claims against 
Murray without putting forth any reasoning or analysis.  When a district court dismisses a 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to be 
upheld, it must be evident that the district court dismissed the complaint because the 
complaint failed to state a claim, rather than because the non-moving party did not file a 
response to the moving party’s motion to dismiss.  See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 
F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Here, after Calhoun filed his motion for an extension of time, the District Court 
issued the following order: 
“[T]he motion to dismiss filed by Lawrence F. Murray is GRANTED.  All 
claims against Lawrence F. Murray are DISMISSED.  THIS CASE IS 
CLOSED.” 
 
This order simply does not provide enough analysis for this Court to conclude that 
Calhoun’s complaint against Murray was dismissed for valid reasons.  As noted, the 
District Court was permitted to deny Calhoun’s motion for an extension of time to file his 
response to Murray’s motion to dismiss, but the District Court was not permitted to 
dismiss Calhoun’s claims solely because he did not file a response.  Thus, while we are 
mindful of the problems of district courts in dealing with a large volume of litigation, we 
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nevertheless conclude that under Stackhouse, the District Court erred in failing to provide 
any reasoning or analysis in this situation. 
E. 
 Calhoun argues that this case should be remanded to the District Court with an 
order for the District Court to remand to the state court.4
 In regard to service of process upon the United States, its agencies, corporations, 
officers, or employees, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “service of 
  Calhoun specifically asserts that 
the case was untimely removed from the state court to the District Court and thus should 
be returned to the state court for proper adjudication.  “The notice of removal of a civil 
action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, 
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading.”  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).  
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] named defendant’s time to remove is 
triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the 
complaint, through service or otherwise, after and apart from service of the summons, but 
not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service.”  Murphy Bros., 
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (emphasis added). 
                                              
4 To be sure, because the District Court’s orders will be vacated, this Court has the 
authority to order the District Court to remand the case to the state court.  While an 
appellate court will not overturn a final judgment on the basis of a defect in removal if, at 
the time of judgment, the district court would have had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the action had it initially been brought in federal court, see Grubbs v. General Elec. 
Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972), that rule does not apply when the court of 
appeals vacates the district court’s judgment, leaving no judgment on the merits.  See 16 
James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 107.41[1][c][ii][C] (3d ed. 1997). 
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process shall be effected by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 
United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought . . . and by also 
sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the 
Attorney General of the United States.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1). 
 Here, as noted by the Federal Appellees, the 30-day removal period of 
§ 1446(b)(1) was never triggered because Calhoun failed to perfect service upon the 
defendants.  According to the certificate of service, Calhoun’s “praecipe,” which was 
styled as a complaint, was sent to each of the defendants via first class mail without any 
accompanying summons.  In addition, neither the United States Attorney for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania nor the Attorney General of the United States were served with 
the praecipe.  Therefore, Calhoun never perfected service upon the defendants, and the 
30-day time period for removing to federal court has not yet commenced.  Removal was 
thus premature. 
 Despite this defect of premature removal, we decline to remand this case to the 
state court.  Although the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is to be strictly 
construed in favor of state court adjudication, see Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985), the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, 
upon which removal was premised in this matter, should be broadly construed in favor of 
a federal forum.  See Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1262 (3d Cir. 
1994).  This is because “one of the primary purposes for the [federal officer] removal 
statute – as its history clearly demonstrates – was to have [federal] defenses litigated in 
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the federal courts” including “the defense of official immunity.”  Willingham v. Morgan, 
395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). 
 There are a number of factors weighing against remand to the state court in this 
matter.  First, the gravamen of Calhoun’s claims are federal in nature, involving federal 
actors, and are better suited for a federal forum.  Second, the procedural defect in removal 
was not the result of bad faith or undue delay on the part of the defendants.  Third, a 
remand to the state court for Calhoun to formally perfect service so that the defendants 
can properly remove the case to the District Court would be a waste of judicial resources.  
The District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Calhoun’s claims and the 
procedural defect in removal does not outweigh the policy considerations of keeping this 
case in federal court.5
IV. 
 
 The District Court erred in dismissing Calhoun’s claims against Mann and 
Goldstein on res judicata grounds and failed to provide adequate reasoning in dismissing 
Calhoun’s claim against Murray.  Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s orders and 
remand the case to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.6
                                              
5 We have also considered Calhoun’s arguments that the District Court erred in not 
allowing him to amend his complaint and that removal was improper because it occurred 
while the case was in an appellate posture.  Neither argument has merit or warrants 
further discussion. 
 
6 We note once again, as we did at oral argument, our appreciation of the excellent 
work of appointed counsel for Calhoun. 
